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IN A SPEECH PREPARED FOR SENATE DELIVERY BUT WHICH HE MADE 
AVAILABLE TODAY, FRIDAY, APRIL~ SENATOR MANSFIELD 
(D., MONTANA) SAID: ---
Mr. President: The opposition to the nationalist government of YfJoD~ D~ 
which has never ceased in underground conspiracy and sabotage has now 
come out in an open military action designed to destroy that government. 
There has already been considerable fighting and bloodshe d in the streets 
of Saigon. 
For a time the Viet Namese government appeared to be making 
some progress in consolidating the non - communist position in south Viet 
Nam. Headed by Ngo Dien Diem, that government has had the full coopera-
tion of the United States. 
The Diem government made clear from its inception that it was 
dedicated to the independence and welfare of the people of Viet Nam. 
Because it was, it antagonized powerful forces, native and otherwise, 
in Saigon-Cholon. For the first time, the Viet Minh communist forces 
in the north found themselves confronted with an opposition which had 
some chance of capturing the loyalties of the Viet Namese people which 
they had monopolized by default prior to its advent. 
As members of the Senate may recall, I have visited Viet Nam 
during the course of two study missions in Indochina and have reported 
my observations to the Committee on Foreign Relations. I have also 
spoken on the situation in Indochina from time to time in this body. 
I have not been in Viet Nam since last September, and I do not 
know the full details of th~ present crisis. I assume that the President 
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and the Secretary of State do have tl1osc details since they bear reaponsibihty 
{or fitting our policy to developments in Viet Nam. 
Recent news reports from Saigon and clsewh~rc, hOWC\'Cr. do nive 
a general picture of what has been going on in south Viet Nam. They tell 
of French dissatisfaction with the Diem government and the bitter animosity 
of various sects and other groups towards that government because of its 
attempts to curtail their independent power and revenue. The Diem govern-
ment has been portrayed for weeks as on the verge of overthrow, with its 
Premier unable to consolidate his authority in the country. 
They also tell of the incredibly sordid situation which the nationalist 
government inherited after the Geneva truce, They tell of the near-anarchy in 
the south and the callous corruption in Saigon. They do not tell of the constant 
efforts to undercut the government by an under-cover conspiracy that operates 
back and forth between the French Riviera and the city of Saigon-Cholon. 
Now that conspiracy has finally come out in the open. \'.'e see the 
incredible spectacle of the .?remier of the Government, Ngo Dien Diem, being 
summoned to Paris in the midst of a revolt precipitated by racketeers. We se< 
the incredible spectacle of a military leader who had sought refuge a1:1ong the 
racketeers being appointed by a Chief of State in Cannes over the head of the 
premier as commander of the national army which is supposed to suppress 
the racketeer 1 s revolt . 
There is nothing new in this picture, except the open fighting. It is pre-
cisely the kind of situation with which the Diem government has had to contend 
since the outset, There is nothing in it which would lead me to revise the con-
t:luo\""'~ which l reacheti l~r~ vear. :)r. Oct"l--" - 1c~'h !. reportt>d th,..-;e c-onclu-
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sions to the Committee on Foreign Relations. I should like to re-emphasize 
them at this time by reading pertinent: sections: 
A year ago, the principal requirements for the 
success of our policy with respect to Indochina were political. 
These requirements, full independence and effective internal 
goverment, notably in Vietnam, have not been effectively 
fulfilled. The failure in this respect appears also to have been 
accompanied by a consistent underestimating of both the political 
and military strength of the Vietminh, on the part of practically 
all concerned. In consequence, the situation has seriously 
deteriorated. 
The United States shares responsibility for the rever-
sal in Indochina. We should not make the mistake, however, 
of assuming all the blame. We gave material aid unstintingly, 
but its value was dissipated by inadequacies elsewhere . I 
report this, not so much in criticism-- I am fully aware of the 
great contributions to the common cause made by sincere French 
officials and sincere Vietnamese nationalists- -but rather to make 
clear that this country has discharged the commitments which it 
was asked to make last year and which it agreed to make. At 
that time it was not asked to commit and was even discouraged 
from committing manpower in Indochina. Not until the crisis 
of Dien Bien Phu did the question even arise. Then the pres-
sures of American opinion operating largely through Congress 
discouraged a hasty, ill-conceived involvement. Our share in 
the defense of Indochina was clearly understood at the outset to 
be the supply of material aid only and we quite properly insisted 
that this understanding be maintained. The situation in Indo-
china is only one of the many crises that confront us and the 
burden of sustaining freedom in the world must be equitably 
borne. 
At present, there appears to be, at best, scant hope of 
achieving the objectives of our policy in Indochina in the near 
future, with Cambodia the only exception to this conclusion. The 
present Government of Vietnarr. which is based on the sound 
principles of national independence, an end to corruption and 
internal amelioration, is immobilized largely by a squabbling 
plotting opposition. Its crltics complain of the personality of 
the leader of that Government. In view of the numerous and 
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vaned personahties who have occup1ed the Pre 1d ncy 1n 
Sa1gon during the past Z or 3 years w1thout tnng1ble result , 
1t seems more hkely that the real question 1s one of 
dusntisfact1on w1th the prmc1plcs of the D1em government 
rather than the inadcquac1es of hlS pcrsonahty. 
Should the D1em government be forced out of ofhcc, 1t 
1s doubtful that under the pressure of t1me a more sau&fnctory, 
subst1tute, subscribmg to the same principles to wh1ch he docs, 
w1ll be :found. Yet these pr1nc1ples must preva1l 1n south 
Vietnam , if an alternative to the Communist V1etmmh tltat 11 
likely to be acceptable to the people of Vietnam 1s to exist 
Any replacement of D:em at this time, if it occurs, will 
probably take the form of a military dictatorship based upon 
a coalition of the special interests, pa1·tics, and groups which 
now oppose the present Government. It is improbable that 
the sub£ltitute will be the ktnd of government which w1ll be 
generally supported by the Vietnamese people any more than 
the pre-Diem governments were. Nor is it likely to be a 
government capable of sustaining a free and independent 
Vietnam eventually without fore1gn support. It was to develop 
that kind of Vietnam that the United States made available 
hundreds of millions of dollars of a1d. In my view, only that 
kind of Vietna:n can achieve the purpose of our policy in 
Indochina which, in the final analysis, is its freedom and the 
conscquont enhancement of our own security. 
In the event that the Diem government falls, therefore, 
I believe that the Umted States shot:ld considct· an immediate 
suspenston of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces 
there, except that uf a humanitarian nature, preliminary to a 
complete reappraisal of our present policies in F~ce Vietnam. 
Unless there is reasonable expectation of fulfilling our objec-
tives the continued expcndi ture of the resources of the citizens 
of the United States is unwarranted and inexcusable. 
Two parts of those conclusions should be underlined in connection 
with the presP.nt r:risis. They bear directly on it. 
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1. Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it is 
doubtful that a more satisfactory substitute subscribing to the 
same principles which he does, will be found. Yet those 
principles must prevail in south Vietnam, if an alternative 
to the Communist Vietminh that is likely to be acceptable to 
the people of Vietnam is to exist. 
and 
2. In the event that the Diem Government falls, I believe 
that the United States should consider an immediate sus-
pension of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces 
there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to 
a complete reappraisal of our present policies in Free 
Vietnam. 
A showdown in Saigon is now in progress. I know that there are 
side issues in this struggle, I know that it has been contended and perhaps 
correctly that Diem is too uncompromising in his dealings with other 
political leaders who are inclined towards the nationalist cause, Basically, 
however, the showdown is between two sets of forces in VietNam. The 
one, presently personified by Diem, stands for a decent and honest govern-
ment in an independent VietNam. The military power aligned against it is 
based on those who have little concept of, little concern, or downright con-
tempt for what these terms mean. Diem has recently expressed his intention 
of holding elections as a first step towards representative government. Who 
opposes these elections? Those, apparently, whose power is not based on the 
consent of the people over whom it is exercised. The opponents of the Diem 
government have power but it is a power built largely on corruption and the 
fear that their private armed forces inspire. It is the power of the Black Band, 
the pirate, th~ mercenary, the racketeer, and the witch doctor. 
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l£ the torccs stand1ng !or decency and honesty and genumc 
nattonal independence !ail tn thie crlSu;, the cause of human freedom 1n 
Asia will not ga1n. This country w1ll not gain. France wtll not really 
gain. Even those V1etnamese who help to bring about the downfall of 
the government, in the long run, wtll not gam. Only the Commumsts w1ll 
gain. 
It is possible that a semblance o! stabil1ty may be produced in 
Saigon i! a coalition of the corrupt under a thin veneer of 1 cspectability 
replaces the present government. Beneath the surface, however, the 
penetration of communism will go on inevitably. 
My view of the present crisis remains as I expressed it in the 
conclusions of the report which I read today. Current developments 
seem to me only to emphasize the pertinence of those conclusions. 
It is possible that the Executive Branch has information on the 
situation in south VietNam going far beyond that which 1s currently 
appearing in the press. General Collins, who has been doing a 
difficult job with superb devotion to duty, in support of the Diem government, 
has just reported to the President and the Secretary of State. It may be 
that in time this body will be advised of facts which we do not now have. 
It may be that the President and the Secretary of State will find it 
neces,:ar)' to alter the present direction of our policy in Viet N<!m. 
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That is entirely possible and, if it is the case, it certainly lies 
within their responsibility to make the necessary adjustments. I am 
confident, however, that this government will not align itself with the kind of 
forces which are now in r.1ilitary and conspiratorial opposition to Diem. 
The expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars in support of those forces 
would be, it seems to me, entirely unwarranted, I believe the American 
people would expect an explanation which will show how any such expenditures 
could contribute to the national interests of this country. It would be the 
responsibility of the Congress to see that they get it. Our national interests 
with respect to VietNam can be furthered only if our policies serve to lead 
to a VietNamese government which is independent and which can put down 
solid roots in the VietNamese populace. 
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